

Statistical Verification of Security-Related Hyperproperties


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
In collaboration with Siddhu Nalluri and Borzoo Bonakdarpour




Motivation: Enable Statistical Model Checking for security-related **hyperproperties**.

What is a Hyperproperty?

Toyota Powertrain Benchmark




Embedded Computer



Hyperproperty: a property about the relation between multiple system paths.

AF ratio deviation:

$$e(t) = \frac{|\mu(t) - \mu_{\text{ref}}|}{\mu_{\text{ref}}}$$



Combustion Process

State	Unit	Description
p	bar	Intake Manifold Pressure
λ_c	-	A/F Ratio in Cylinder
λ_m	-	Transfer Function Output
p_e	bar	Estimated Manifold Pressure
i	-	Integrator State, PI
\dot{m}_{af}	g/s	Inlet Air Mass Flow Rate
\dot{m}_c	g/s	Air Flow Rate to Cylinder
\dot{m}_ϕ	g/s	Fuel Mass Aspirated into the Cylinder
\dot{m}_ψ	g/s	Fuel Mass Injected into Intake Manifold
θ_{in}	degrees	Throttle Angle Input
θ	degrees	Delay-Filtered Throttle Angle
$\hat{\theta}$	-	O/P of Throttle Polynomial
F_c	g/s	Command fuel
ω	rad/sec	Engine Speed
n	round/sec	Engine Speed ($\frac{\omega}{2\pi}$)

Example: Sensitivity under parameter change

$$\Pr_{\pi_1, \pi_2} (|\tau^{\pi_1} - \tau^{\pi_2}| \leq \delta) > 1 - \epsilon$$

Probabilistic noninterference:

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi_{h=1}}(\pi_{h=1} \text{ outputs } l = 1) \approx \mathbb{P}^{\pi_{h=2}}(\pi_{h=2} \text{ outputs } l = 1)$$

Example: Consider a parallel program \mathbf{P} of two threads

\mathbf{th}_1 : while $h > 0$ do $\{h \leftarrow h - 1; l \leftarrow 1\}$ | \mathbf{th}_2 : $l \leftarrow 2$

where $h \in \{1, 2\}$ is hidden; and $l \in \{1, 2\}$ is public.

The CPU chooses to run one step of a random thread at each time.


- If $h = 1$, \mathbf{th}_1 has 1 steps, and \mathbf{th}_2 has 1 step. So when \mathbf{P} stops, $l = 1$ w.p. 1/2.
- If $h = 2$, \mathbf{th}_1 has 2 steps, and \mathbf{th}_2 has 1 step. So when \mathbf{P} stops, $l = 1$ w.p. 1/3.

So, the value of h will be (unintentionally) leaked by the value of l .

General criterion: deciding the correctness of a hyperproperty requires multiple path.

Outline

1. New logics HyperPCTL* for discrete-time hyperproperties.
2. New SMC tool for HyperPCTL*.
3. Case Studies on challenging security problems.
4. Related work I: Continuous-time hyperproperties
5. Related work II: Conformance



PCTL*: $\varphi ::= a \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \mathbf{X}\varphi \mid \varphi \mathbf{U}_T \varphi \mid \mathbb{P}_{\sim p} \varphi$

- a is an **atomic proposition/event** (if a happens now);
- \neg means “not”; \wedge means “and”;
- $\mathbf{X}\varphi$ means φ holds next;
- $\varphi_1 \mathbf{U}_T \varphi_2$ means φ_1 holds **until** φ_2 becomes true;
- $\sim \in \{>, <, \geq, \leq\}$, $\mathbb{P}_{>p} \varphi$ means φ holds with probability $> p$

Issue: all the events a and probability $\mathbb{P}_{>p}$ are (implicitly) taken w.r.t. a single path.

HyperPCTL: $\varphi ::= a^\pi \mid \varphi^\pi \mid \neg\varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \mathbf{U}_T \varphi \mid p \sim p$

$p ::= \mathbb{P}^\Pi \varphi \mid \mathbb{P}^\Pi p \mid f(p, \dots, p)$

- a replaced by a^π , π is a path variable,
- \mathbb{P} replaced by \mathbb{P}^Π , Π is a set of path variables,

Example: Probabilistic Noninterference

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1} \left((h = 1)_{\pi_1} \rightarrow \mathbf{F}(l = 1)_{\pi_1} \right) \approx \mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} \left((h = 2)_{\pi_2} \rightarrow \mathbf{F}(l = 1)_{\pi_2} \right)$$

- $\mathbb{P}_{\sim p} \varphi$ replaced by a set of rules $p ::= \mathbb{P}^\Pi \varphi \mid \mathbb{P}^\Pi p \mid f(p, \dots, p)$ and $p \sim p$; f is an elementary function

Example: KL-Divergence

$$KL \left(\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1} \left((h = 1)_{\pi_1} \rightarrow \mathbf{F}(l = 1)_{\pi_1} \right), \mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} \left((h = 2)_{\pi_2} \rightarrow \mathbf{F}(l = 1)_{\pi_2} \right) \right) < c$$

Theorem 1: HyperPCTL* is well-defined.

Theorem 2: HyperPCTL* is strictly more expressive than PCTL*.

Model: Unknown Discrete-time Markov Chains

Challenges of SMC for HyperPCTL*


- Probabilistic quantifications of **multiple** parallel paths $\mathbb{P}^{(\pi_1, \pi_2)} \varphi^{(\pi_1, \pi_2)} < p$
- **Nested** probabilistic path quantification $\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1} (\mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} \varphi^{(\pi_1, \pi_2)} < p_2) < p_1$
- **Joint** probabilities $(\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2) \in D$

Statistical Model Checking for $(\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) \in D$

Assumption (Indifference region):

$$(\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) \notin D_1 / D_0$$

where $D_0 \subseteq D \subseteq D_1$



SMC as Hypothesis Testing:

$$\begin{cases} H_0 \text{ (True): } (\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) \in D_0 \\ H_1 \text{ (False): } (\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) \notin D_1 \end{cases}$$

No existing statistical method for multidimensional D_0 and D_1 !

SMC for $(\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) \in D$


SMC as Hypothesis Testing:

$$T1: \begin{cases} H_0 \text{ (True)}: (\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) \in D_0 \\ H_1 \text{ (False)}: (\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) \notin D_1 \end{cases}$$

Simplified Hypothesis Testing:

$$T2: \begin{cases} H_0 \text{ (True)}: (\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) = \underline{r} \\ H_1 \text{ (False)}: (\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2}) = \underline{q} \end{cases}$$

Vector $\underline{r}, \underline{q}$ are derived from $D_0, D_1, \underline{p}^{MLE}$



Theorem 1: $T2 \rightarrow T1$


Remark 1: $(\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1^{\Pi_1}, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2^{\Pi_2})$ may be neither r or q .

Remark 2: r or q may change with samples

Statistical Model Checking for HyperPCTL*

Challenges of SMC for HyperPCTL*

- Probabilistic quantifications of **multiple** parallel paths $\mathbb{P}^{(\pi_1, \pi_2)} \varphi^{(\pi_1, \pi_2)} < p$
- **Nested** probabilistic path quantification $\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1} (\mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} \varphi^{(\pi_1, \pi_2)} < p_2) < p_1$
- **Joint** probabilities $(\mathbb{P}^{\Pi_1} \varphi_1, \mathbb{P}^{\Pi_2} \varphi_2) \in D$



- Hyperproperties
- Provable significance level

GabFeed

- Chat server with encryption
- Encryption time may depend on private key
- Check encryption time for several baskets of keys
- We verified a time side-channel

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1} \left((\bigcirc S_1^{\pi_1}) \Rightarrow (\diamond^{\leq k} F^{\pi_1}) \right) \\ \approx_{\varepsilon} \mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} \left((\bigcirc S_2^{\pi_2}) \Rightarrow (\diamond^{\leq k} F^{\pi_2}) \right)$$

Horizon	ε	Significance	Acc.	No. Samples	Time (s)
60	0.05	0.01	1.00	5.5e+02	0.54
60	0.05	0.001	1.00	5.5e+03	5.76
60	0.1	0.01	1.00	6.1e+02	0.60
60	0.1	0.001	1.00	6.2e+03	7.16
90	0.05	0.01	1.00	3.7e+02	0.46
90	0.05	0.001	1.00	3.7e+03	4.94
90	0.1	0.01	1.00	4.1e+02	0.48
90	0.1	0.001	1.00	4.1e+03	5.37
120	0.05	0.01	1.00	3.8e+02	6.96
120	0.05	0.001	1.00	2.2e+03	11.24
120	0.1	0.01	1.00	3.8e+02	6.05
120	0.1	0.001	1.00	2.3e+03	9.46

Parallel Program with N threads

- Markov model of $N!$ States
- We verified probabilistic interference

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1} \left((\bigcirc H_0^{\pi_1}) \Rightarrow (\diamond(F^{\pi_1} \wedge L_0^{\pi_1})) \right) \\ \approx_{\varepsilon} \mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} \left((\bigcirc H_1^{\pi_2}) \Rightarrow (\diamond(F^{\pi_2} \wedge L_0^{\pi_2})) \right)$$

Threads	Significance	Acc.	No. Samples	Time (s)
20	0.01	1.00	7.7e+02	0.49
20	0.001	1.00	7.6e+03	6.45
50	0.01	1.00	7.0e+02	0.48
50	0.001	1.00	6.8e+03	6.39
100	0.01	1.00	6.5e+02	0.54
100	0.001	1.00	6.6e+03	7.10

Dining Cryptographers

- [Chaum, 80s]
- Markov model of at least 2^N states
- We verified information security

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1} (\diamond(\neg S_{ij}^{\pi_1} \wedge \diamond P^{\pi_1})) &\approx_{\varepsilon} \mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} (\diamond(S_{ij}^{\pi_2} \wedge \diamond P^{\pi_2})) \\ &\approx_{\varepsilon} \mathbb{P}^{\pi_3} (\diamond(\neg S_{ij}^{\pi_3} \wedge \diamond P^{\pi_3})) \approx_{\varepsilon} \mathbb{P}^{\pi_4} (\diamond(S_{ij}^{\pi_4} \wedge \diamond P^{\pi_4}))\end{aligned}$$

Agents	δ	Acc.	No. Samples	Time (s)
100	0.05	1.00	1.0e+03	0.91
100	0.1	1.00	5.2e+02	0.39
100	0.2	1.00	2.8e+02	0.14
1000	0.05	0.98	1.1e+03	3.27
1000	0.1	1.00	5.5e+02	1.52
1000	0.2	1.00	2.8e+02	0.69

[Significance level 0.01]

Randomized Cache Replacement Policy

- [Canones, Kopf, and Reineke, '17]
- Least recently used (LRU) is not secure
- Markov model of $N!$ States
- We verified security


$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1}(\bigcirc^{(N)} \square^{\leq T} \mathbb{H}^{\pi_1}) > \mathbb{P}^{\pi_2}(\bigcirc^{(N)} \varphi^{\pi_2}) + \varepsilon$$

$$\varphi^{\pi_2} = (\mathbb{M}^{\pi_2} \wedge \bigcirc \mathbb{H}^{\pi_2} \wedge \dots \wedge \bigcirc^{(T-1)} \mathbb{H}^{\pi_2}) \\ \vee \dots \vee (\mathbb{H}^{\pi_2} \wedge \dots \wedge \bigcirc^{(T-2)} \mathbb{H}^{\pi_2} \wedge \bigcirc^{(T-1)} \mathbb{M}^{\pi_2})$$

Horizon	ε	Significance	Acc.	No. Samples	Time (s)
10	0.05	0.01	1.00	1.1e+02	0.13
10	0.05	0.001	1.00	1.0e+03	2.56
10	0.01	0.01	1.00	1.2e+02	0.14
10	0.01	0.001	1.00	1.2e+03	2.79
20	0.05	0.01	1.00	6.0e+02	1.49
20	0.05	0.001	1.00	6.2e+03	16.73
20	0.01	0.01	0.99	1.2e+03	2.97
20	0.01	0.001	1.00	1.1e+04	28.99

$$\mathbb{P}^{(\pi_1, \pi_2)} \left((\neg Q^{\pi_1} \wedge \neg Q^{\pi_2}) \mathbf{u} \left((Q^{\pi_1} \wedge \mathcal{F}_{[0, \delta]} Q^{\pi_2}) \mathbf{V} \mathbf{a} (Q^{\pi_2} \wedge \mathcal{F}_{[0, \delta]} Q^{\pi_1}) \right) \right) > 1 - \varepsilon$$


Fuel Control System Model



δ	ε	α	Acc.	Sam.	Time (s)	Ans.
0.15	0.95	0.05	1.00	5.9e+01	8.1e+00	True
0.15	0.95	0.01	1.00	9.0e+01	1.3e+01	True
0.15	0.99	0.05	0.99	6.6e+01	9.1e+00	False
0.15	0.99	0.01	1.00	9.7e+01	1.4e+01	False
0.20	0.95	0.05	0.98	5.9e+01	8.1e+00	True
0.20	0.95	0.01	1.00	9.0e+01	1.2e+01	True
0.20	0.99	0.05	1.00	3.0e+02	4.2e+01	True
0.20	0.99	0.01	0.99	4.6e+02	1.8e+02	True

Related Work I: HyperPSTL

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi_1} (|\mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} ((\neg Q_i^{\pi_1} \wedge \neg Q_j^{\pi_2}) \mathcal{U} (Q_i^{\pi_1} \wedge \diamond_{[\tau, \infty)} Q_j^{\pi_2})) - \mathbb{P}^{\pi_2} ((\neg Q_i^{\pi_2} \wedge \neg Q_j^{\pi_1}) \mathcal{U} (Q_j^{\pi_2} \wedge \diamond_{[\tau, \infty)} Q_i^{\pi_1}))| \leq \delta) \geq 1 - \varepsilon.$$




Small: 1 server + 2 processors

t	δ	ε	α	Acc.	Sam.	Time (s)	Ans.
0.1	0.1	0.1	0.05	1.00	1.5e+02	8.0e+01	False
0.1	0.5	0.5	0.05	1.00	1.4e+02	8.2e+01	False
5.0	0.1	0.1	0.05	1.00	7.3e+02	3.9e+02	True
5.0	0.5	0.5	0.05	1.00	3.1e+01	1.9e+01	True

Large: 25 server + 20 processors


Queueing Network (Small)



t	δ	ε	α	Acc.	Sam.	Time (s)	Ans.
0.1	0.1	0.1	0.05	1.00	2.1e+02	3.2e+02	False
0.1	0.5	0.5	0.05	1.00	3.3e+02	4.9e+02	False
5.0	0.1	0.1	0.05	1.00	6.8e+02	1.1e+03	True
5.0	0.5	0.5	0.05	1.00	4.2e+01	6.6e+01	True

Related Work II: Conformance as Hyperproperty

Conformance: two systems simultaneously satisfy the same **set of** temporal logic specifications.




For any t , $|\Pr_{\sigma_1 \sim \mathcal{M}_1}(\sigma_1 \models \phi_t) - \Pr_{\sigma_2 \sim \mathcal{M}_2}(\sigma_2 \models \phi_t)| < c$.

Wang, Zarei, Bonakdarpour, Pajic, ICCPS 21 submitted

Conformance of Simplified and Full Model of Toyota Powertrain

$$\forall \tau \geq 0. \quad \Pr_{\sigma_a \sim \mathcal{M}_a}(\sigma_a \models \diamond_{[0.22, \tau]}(|e_{A/F}| < 0.05)) \\ \approx_c \Pr_{\sigma_f \sim \mathcal{M}_f}(\sigma_f \models \diamond_{[0.22, \tau]}(|e_{A/F}| < 0.05)).$$


c	α_d	$\delta_{n,m}$	Samples	Time (sec.)	\mathcal{A}
0.40	0.99	1.00	3.9e+01	1.8e-02	F
0.40	0.95	1.00	1.9e+01	4.4e-03	F
0.25	0.99	1.00	2.5e+01	4.6e-03	F
0.25	0.95	1.00	1.3e+01	2.2e-03	F
0.10	0.99	1.00	1.8e+01	3.6e-03	F
0.10	0.95	1.00	9.0e+00	1.6e-03	F
0.05	0.99	1.00	1.6e+01	2.8e-03	F
0.05	0.95	1.00	8.0e+00	1.3e-03	F



Conformance of MPC and NN of Lane-Keeping System

$$\forall \tau \geq 0. \quad \Pr_{\sigma_1 \sim \mathcal{M}_{\text{NN}}}(\sigma_1 \models \diamond_{[0,\tau]}(|e_y^{\text{NN}}| < \gamma)) \\ \approx_c \Pr_{\sigma_2 \sim \mathcal{M}_{\text{MPC}}}(\sigma_2 \models \diamond_{[0,\tau]}(|e_y^{\text{MPC}}| < \gamma)),$$

NN (30 Neurons per Layer)						NN (45 Neurons per Layer)				
c	α_d	$\delta_{n,m}$	Samples	$T(s)$	\mathcal{A}	$\delta_{n,m}$	Samples	$T(s)$	\mathcal{A}	
0.40	0.99	0.98	4.3e+01	7.4e-03	F	0.36	1.0e+04	9.6e+00	T	
0.40	0.95	1.00	1.9e+01	3.1e-03	F	0.36	3.6e+03	2.0e+00	T	
0.25	0.99	1.00	2.5e+01	4.1e-03	F	0.37	9.5e+02	3.2e-01	F	
0.25	0.95	1.00	1.3e+01	2.1e-03	F	0.42	2.5e+02	5.9e-02	F	
0.10	0.99	1.00	1.8e+01	3.0e-03	F	0.36	2.1e+02	4.2e-02	F	
0.10	0.95	1.00	9.0e+00	1.6e-03	F	0.35	1.2e+02	2.2e-02	F	
0.05	0.99	1.00	1.6e+01	2.7e-03	F	0.38	1.3e+02	2.5e-02	F	
0.05	0.95	1.00	8.0e+00	1.2e-03	F	0.36	7.3e+01	1.4e-02	F	



Thank you

