

# Distributed Beamforming in Adversarial Environments

Yagiz Savas and Ufuk Topcu

in collaboration with Abolfazl Hashemi, Abraham P. Vinod, Brian M. Sadler


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# Wireless Communications in the Presence of Adversaries



A group of robots are deployed in an environment from which they collect **confidential** data. Each robot carries a **single antenna**. The robots aim to **securely communicate** the data with the client in the presence of **adversaries whose locations are unknown** to the robots.

# Beamforming as a Wireless Communication Technique: **Main Idea**

- A message signal  $s(t)$  has **a phase and an amplitude**.
- Each robot multiplies the signal  $s(t)$  with a complex number  $w_i \in \mathbb{C}$  and **adjusts the phase and the amplitude** of the transmitted signal.
- Superposition of the transmitted signals result in a **constructive (or destructive) interference**.







Illustration: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phased\\_array](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phased_array)

# Beamforming as a Wireless Communication Technique: **Main Idea**


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# Beamforming as a Wireless Communication Technique: **Benefits**




Single robot equipped with an isotropic antenna



- **No directionality**
- **Low SINR**




Two robots each equipped with an isotropic antenna



- **Improved directionality**
- **Improved SINR**

Distributed beamforming enables a group of robots to **control the directionality of the transmission** and to **enhance the reliability of the communication link**.


# Secure Communication Problem: An Informal Problem Statement



Design a transmission strategy and an encoder-decoder pair such that the client recovers the data  $S^K$  and no adversary can decrease its uncertainty on  $S^K$  by eavesdropping on the transmission.

# Related Work

- **No adversaries:** optimal beamformer can be found analytically <sup>[1]</sup>
- **Adversaries with known locations:** convex optimization-based beamformers <sup>[2]</sup>
- **Adversaries with unknown locations:** minimize SINR in all directions by broadcasting artificial noise <sup>[3]</sup>



- Ozarow and Wyner <sup>[4]</sup> showed in 1984 that if  $S^K$  is encoded into  $X^N$ , then

$\mu_i$  : number of symbols received by adversary  $a_i$


$$\mu_i \leq N - K \implies H(S^K | Z^{N,i}) = K$$

**Implication:** We can let each adversary receive  $N - K$  symbols and still establish a secure communication

[1] Lorenz, R. G. and Boyd, S. P., "Robust minimum variance beamforming", IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 2005  
 [2] Liao et al, "QoS-Based Transmit Beamforming in the Presence of Eavesdroppers", IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 2010  
 [3] Goel, S. And Negi, R., "Guaranteeing Secrecy Using Artificial Noise", IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 2008  
 [4] Ozarow, L. H. and Wyner, A. D., "Wire-Tap Channel II", AT&T Bell Laboratories technical journal, 1984

# Contributions

- We approach the problem from a **sequential decision-making** perspective



If there are  $L \in \mathbb{N}$  adversaries in the environment, we choose  $N = LK$ .

Security requirement:

$$\mu_i \leq N - K = K(L - 1)$$


We design a **periodic transmission strategy** which ensures that each adversary  $a_i$  receives **at most  $K(L - 1)$**  symbols although the exact locations of the adversaries are unknown to the agents

**The proposed periodic strategy enables the agents to securely communicate with the client in scenarios in which all stationary strategies fail to ensure security**



# Environment Model

- A group of  $m \in \mathbb{N}$  agents aim to communicate **an information sequence**  $S^K = (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_K)$  with a client located in the far-field direction  $\theta_c \in [-\pi, \pi)$ .
- Each agent carries an ideal isotropic antenna with **maximum transmit power**  $P > 0$ .
- The agents map  $S^K$  into **an encoded sequence**  $X^N = (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_N)$ , where  $N \geq K$ , and transmit  $X^N$ .
- There are  $L \in \mathbb{N}$  **adversaries**  $\{a_i : i \in [L]\}$ , located also in the far-field region, that eavesdrop on the transmission.
- **Exact directions of the adversaries are unknown** to the agents; however, for each  $i \in [L]$ , there exists **a continuous direction interval**  $I_i \subseteq [-\pi, \pi)$  that represents all possible directions for  $a_i$ .



# Transmission model

- At time  $t \in [N]$ , the agents transmit the encoded symbol  $X_t$  as a continuous signal  $s_t$ .
- The vector of signals transmitted by the agents is

$$y_{transmit}[t] = \mathbf{w}_t s_t + \mathbf{v}_t$$

Beamforming vector  $\mathbf{w}_t = [w_1, w_2, \dots, w_m]'$

Artificial noise  $\mathbf{v}_t \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \Sigma_t)$

# Transmission model


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**What is the effect of artificial noise?** <sup>[1]</sup>



Client

If the agents had infinite transmit power, they would minimize the SINR in all adversary directions

# Transmission model

- At time  $t \in [N]$ , the agents transmit the encoded symbol  $X_t$  as a continuous signal  $s_t$ .
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Beamforming vector  $\mathbf{w}_t = [w_1, w_2, \dots, w_m]'$

Artificial noise  $\mathbf{v}_t \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \Sigma_t)$

- Since the maximum transmit power is  $P$ , we have  $w_t(i) + \Sigma_t(i, i) \leq P$ .
- The known narrowband channel between the agent  $i \in [m]$  and a receiver in the direction  $\theta \in [-\pi, \pi)$  is denoted by  $h_i(\theta) \in \mathbb{C}$ .
- Finally, the SINR received from the direction  $\theta$  is

$$SINR_t(\theta) = \frac{\mathbf{w}_t^H \mathbf{H}(\theta) \mathbf{w}_t}{Tr(\mathbf{H}(\theta) \Sigma_t) + \sigma_t^2}$$

Channel matrix  $\mathbf{H}(\theta) = \mathbf{h}(\theta) \mathbf{h}(\theta)^H$

$Tr(M)$  denotes the trace of the matrix  $M$


$\sigma_t^2$  is the variance of the ambient noise

# Ensuring Security with a Periodic Transmission Strategy

- The objective is to find a sequence  $((\mathbf{w}_1, \Sigma_1), (\mathbf{w}_2, \Sigma_2), \dots, (\mathbf{w}_N, \Sigma_N))$  of pairs  $(\mathbf{w}_t, \Sigma_t)$  such that
  - The client receives all transmitted symbols  $X_t$
  - Each adversary receives at most  $N - K$  symbols

**STEP 1:** Let  $N = LK$ , i.e., information rate is  $R = 1/L$ . Such an encoding can be achieved by using  $[N, N - K]$  linear maximum-distance-separable codes.

**STEP 2:** Synthesize a periodic transmission strategy



$$\begin{aligned}
 & \min_{\mathbf{w}_k \in \mathbb{C}^m, \Sigma_k \succeq 0} \quad \text{Tr}(\Sigma_k) + \|\mathbf{w}_k\|_2^2 \\
 & \quad s.t. \quad \text{SINR}_k(\theta_c) \geq \gamma_c \\
 & \quad \forall \theta \in I_k, \quad \text{SINR}_k(\theta) \leq \gamma_a \\
 & \quad \forall i \in [m], \quad \mathbf{w}_k(i) + \Sigma_k(i, i) \leq P
 \end{aligned}$$

- ← Minimize power
- ← Client receives the transmitted symbol
- ← Adversary  $a_k$  cannot receive the transmitted symbol
- ← Power constraints are satisfied

# Semi-Definite Program Relaxation and Probabilistic Approximation

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \min_{\mathbf{w}_k \in \mathbb{C}^m, \Sigma_k \succeq 0} \text{Tr}(\Sigma_k) + \|\mathbf{w}_k\|_2^2 \\
 & \text{s.t. } \text{SINR}_k(\theta_c) \geq \gamma_c \\
 & \forall \theta \in I_k, \text{SINR}_k(\theta) \leq \gamma_a \\
 & \forall i \in [m], \mathbf{w}_k(i) + \Sigma_k(i, i) \leq P
 \end{aligned}$$

writing explicitly  
 $\longleftrightarrow$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \min_{\mathbf{W}_k \succeq 0, \Sigma_k \succeq 0} \text{Tr}(\Sigma_k) + \text{Tr}(\mathbf{W}_k) \\
 & \text{s.t. } \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta_c)\mathbf{W}_k) \geq \gamma_c \left( \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta_c)\Sigma_k) + \sigma_k^2 \right) \\
 & \forall \theta \in I_k, \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta)\mathbf{W}_k) \leq \gamma_a \left( \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta)\Sigma_k) + \sigma_k^2 \right) \\
 & \forall i \in [m], \mathbf{W}_k(i, i) + \Sigma_k(i, i) \leq P \\
 & \text{rank}(\mathbf{W}_k) = 1
 \end{aligned}$$

$\Updownarrow$  We show that SDP relaxation is **exact!**

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \min_{\mathbf{W}_k \succeq 0, \Sigma_k \succeq 0} \text{Tr}(\Sigma_k) + \text{Tr}(\mathbf{W}_k) \\
 & \text{s.t. } \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta_c)\mathbf{W}_k) \geq \gamma_c \left( \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta_c)\Sigma_k) + \sigma_k^2 \right) \\
 & \forall \theta \in \Theta_B, \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta)\mathbf{W}_k) \leq \gamma_a \left( \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta)\Sigma_k) + \sigma_k^2 \right) \\
 & \forall i \in [m], \mathbf{W}_k(i, i) + \Sigma_k(i, i) \leq P
 \end{aligned}$$

with probability  $1 - \beta_1$   
 $\longleftrightarrow$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \min_{\mathbf{W}_k \succeq 0, \Sigma_k \succeq 0} \text{Tr}(\Sigma_k) + \text{Tr}(\mathbf{W}_k) \\
 & \text{s.t. } \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta_c)\mathbf{W}_k) \geq \gamma_c \left( \text{Tr}(\mathbf{H}(\theta_c)\Sigma_k) + \sigma_k^2 \right) \\
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 & \forall i \in [m], \mathbf{W}_k(i, i) + \Sigma_k(i, i) \leq P
 \end{aligned}$$





randomly sample  $B \in \mathbb{N}$  points from the infinite set  $I_k$

The following statement is true with probability  $1 - \beta_2$  :  
 If  $B \geq (2 \log_e(\beta_2^{-1}) + 16m^2)/\beta_1$ , the problems are equivalent with probability  $1 - \beta_1$ .<sup>[1]</sup>

[1] Campi, M.C., Garatti, S., and Prandini, M., "The scenario approach for systems and control design", Annual Reviews in Control, 2009


# A Numerical Example

adversary  $a_2$ ,  
unknown directions  $I_2 = \left[ \frac{4\pi}{6}, \frac{7\pi}{6} \right]$




# Conclusions and Future Work

- Distributed beamforming techniques **improve the signal strength and the directionality of the signal**.
- By approaching the wireless communications problem from a **sequential-decision making perspective**, we can improve the security of communication.
- We can synthesize **a transmission strategy, based on a semi-definite program**, that enables a robot group to securely communicate with a client in the presence of adversaries with unknown locations in the environment.



- What is the optimal strategy to group the adversaries that will **minimize the redundancy in communication**?
- How can we modify the proposed algorithms for scenarios in which the **perfect channel state information is unavailable**?





# Thank you for listening

**E-mail:** [yagiz.savas@utexas.edu](mailto:yagiz.savas@utexas.edu)

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**TEXAS**  
The University of Texas at Austin