

Updates on Research and Collaborations

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Center of Excellence for Assured Autonomy in Contested Environments
Fall 2021 Review
November 9th, 2021

UF | Department of Mechanical
& Aerospace Engineering
UNIVERSITY of FLORIDA

UF | UNIVERSITY of
FLORIDA



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UNIVERSITY



TEXAS
The University of Texas at Austin



UC SANTA CRUZ



Collaborations with CoE PIs

- Hybrid multi-agent optimization with Dawn Hustig-Schultz, Ricardo Sanfelice (UCSC)
 - “Exponentially Converging Distributed Gradient Descent with Intermittent Communication via Hybrid Methods” to appear at CDC '21
 - Ricardo visited UF, made plans for next steps/journal version
- New privacy mechanism on the unit simplex with Parham Gohari, Bo Wu, Ufuk Topcu (UT-A)
 - P. Gohari, B. Wu, C. Hawkins, M. Hale and U. Topcu, "Differential Privacy on the Unit Simplex via the Dirichlet Mechanism," *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*, vol. 16, pp. 2326-2340, 2021.
 - Parham visited UF again, worked out basis for private policy synthesis in MDPs
- Resilient multi-agent control with Fred Zegers (UF & AFRL) and John Shea, Warren Dixon (UF)
 - F. M. Zegers, M. T. Hale, J. M. Shea and W. E. Dixon, "Event-Triggered Formation Control and Leader Tracking With Resilience to Byzantine Adversaries: A Reputation-Based Approach," *IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 1417-1429, Sept. 2021.
 - Discussions on incorporating privacy into event-triggered communication



Collaborations with Air Force Colleagues

- Applied optimization work to weapon-target assignment (WTA) problems
 - K. Hendrickson, P. Ganesh, K. Volle, P. Buzaud, K. Brink, and M.T. Hale, "Decentralized Weapon-Target Assignment under Asynchronous Communications", Under review.
 - Kat and Kyle are full-time at UF REEF, collaborations continue
- Developed order-optimal algorithm for anomaly detection in multi-armed bandits with switching costs
 - With Ben Robinson and Beth Morrison at AFRL/RV
 - Publication forthcoming
- Engaging with AFRL every summer
 - William Warke was a Summer Scholar in 2018, 2019 at RW
 - I was a Summer Faculty Fellow at RW in 2020
 - Matthew Ubl was a Summer Scholar in 2021 at RY
 - William Warke applying to RW for 2022,
Gabriel Behrendt applying to RV for 2022

Differential Privacy for Symbolic Systems with applications to Markov Chains


Bo Chen^a, Kevin Leahy^b, Austin Jones^c, Matthew Hale^a

Program Review for Center of Excellence on
Assured Autonomy in Contested Environments

November 9th

Data driven systems create privacy threats

- Modern systems use more data than ever.



- In controls, sensitive information might be agents' dynamics, control inputs, state trajectories, etc.
- Agents might reveal sensitive information while collaborating.
- In this talk, we focus on state trajectories for symbolic systems.

Strong data protections are difficult to get

- Simply making data anonymous does not work, e.g. Netflix was subject to a linkage attack.

NETFLIX


The IMDb logo consists of the letters "IMDb" in a bold, black, sans-serif font, centered within a solid yellow square.

IMDb

- Takeaway: we don't know what else an adversary might know about us.
- Key question: how can we safeguard information against these threats in symbolic systems?

Solution? Differential Privacy!



- Formal definition of privacy from computer science literature.



- In short, randomize data to protect it. (Details later.)
- Immune to post-processing: x is private implies $f(x)$ is private.
- No need to anticipate types of privacy attacks.
- Used by Google, Apple, Uber, and the 2020 Census.

New privacy notions are needed here

- Differential privacy is often implemented on numerical system
 - Numerical system: state trajectories can be represented by numbers.
 - For data x , we have a private data $\tilde{x} = x + z$, z is Gaussian or Laplace noise.





- How about symbolic systems?

Markov chain, a special symbolic system

- In this talk we focus on Markov chains.
- A Markov chain is a stochastic model describing a sequence of random variables $S_1, S_2 \dots S_n$ such that



$$\Pr[S_{t+1}|S_t, S_{t-1}, \dots, S_1] = \Pr[S_{t+1}|S_t]$$



- States can be non-numerical.

Private outputs can't be nonsense

- Goal for privacy of Markov chains: privatize sequence of states.[1]
- For a private sequence $w = s_1 s_2 \dots s_n$ and any t , we must enforce $\Pr[s_{t+1}|s_t] > 0$




Differential Privacy on symbolic systems

- Goal of differential privacy: generate randomized outputs in order to “mask” differences between “similar” sequences.
- “Similar” sequences are defined by adjacency relationship.

Definition 1 (Word Adjacency): For a positive integer n and k , the word adjacency relation between two words w_1, w_2 is $Adj_{n,k} = \{(w_1, w_2) | d(w_1, w_2) \leq k\}$.

Definition 2 (Hamming Distance): The Hamming distance between sequences w_1, w_2 denoted by $d(w_1, w_2)$, is the minimum number of substitutions that can be applied to w_1 to convert it to w_2 .



Differential Privacy on symbolic systems


- Goal of differential privacy: generate randomized outputs in order to “mask” differences between “similar” sequences.
- “Mask” means an adversary can not reliably tell if an output sequence is generated by an individual sequence or any adjacent sequence.

Definition 3 (Word Differential Privacy):

Let $\epsilon > 0$. A randomized algorithm M is ϵ -differential private if for all $S \subseteq \text{Range}(M)$ and for all word adjacent sequence $(w_1, w_2) \in \text{Adj}_{n,k}$ we have

$$\Pr[M(w_1) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \Pr[M(w_2) \in S]$$

- Smaller epsilon implies stronger privacy.
- In literatures, ϵ is ranging from $[0.01, 10]$.^[2]



Which one is generated by “bumper”?

Recipient/ Analyst/ Adversary

We need two types of mechanisms


i) Offline Mechanism (batch privacy)

- Privatize the whole sensitive sequence $w = \sigma_1 \sigma_2 \dots \sigma_n$ at once.



ii) Online Mechanism (real-time privacy)

- Generate differentially private outputs but future states are unknown.




iii) For both

- The private outputs of states are feasible.
- Quantify tradeoffs between privacy and accuracy.

Construct offline mechanism

- Main idea: each feasible sequence can be selected based on Hamming distance. \longrightarrow Time complexity: $O(|S|^n)$.
- Challenge: We need to make sure this is efficient!
- Procedure of constructing offline mechanism.
 - Step 1: Select a Hamming distance l .
 - Step 2: Select a private output from only sequences that have Hamming distance l to the input sequence.



Step 1: Select a Hamming distance

- For an input sequence x , Adjacency $Adj_{|x|,k}$, and privacy parameter ϵ , select a Hamming distance using the distribution


$$\rho(l; |x|, k) = \frac{m_l \exp\left(-\frac{\epsilon l}{2k}\right)}{\sum_{i=0}^{|x|} m_i \exp\left(-\frac{\epsilon i}{2k}\right)}$$

Length of sensitive input word


Number of possible sequences that are distance i from input

$\rho(l; |x|, k)$

For $|x| = 10, k = 1$




Hamming distance l increasing




Step 2: Select a private output

- Find sequences which are with a Hamming distance l efficiently.
- For a non-Markov symbolic system, we can do this using modified Hamming distance automaton. (Will make it Markov in next slide)
- **Takeaway:** This automaton is efficient and generate output sequence.




Set of possible output characters which are independent with each other.



For an input "abc" and $l=2$

Step 2: Select a private output

- Main idea: to extend to a Markov chain, we make synchronous product of the modified Hamming distance automaton and the Markov chain.



- The offline mechanism first selects a Hamming distance l , then selects an output sequence by running a product modified Hamming distance automaton.

Key Result: The offline mechanism is ϵ -differentially private.


Concentration bounds

Theorem 2 (differential privacy and concentration bounds): For an input sequence w_i , let w_o be an output sequence generated by the offline mechanism, then w_o is ϵ -differentially private and the expectation and variance of distance is bounded by


$$\frac{n(N_{min} - 1)B_{\epsilon,k} [(N_{min} - 1)B_{\epsilon,k} + 1]^{n-1}}{\sum_{i=0}^{|x|} m_i \exp\left(-\frac{\epsilon i}{2k}\right)} \leq E[d(w_i, w_o)] \leq \frac{nN_{max}B_{\epsilon,k} [N_{max}B_{\epsilon,k} + 1]^{n-1}}{\sum_{i=0}^{|x|} m_i \exp\left(-\frac{\epsilon i}{2k}\right)}$$

Depends on ϵ and k

N_{min}, N_{max} : min/max outdegree






$N_{min} = 2, N_{max} = 3$



Concentration bounds when $k=1$ and $n=10$.





Online mechanism for Markov chains

- Main idea: each output state is generated based on the most recently generated private state.



Online mechanism for Markov chains

- For a sensitive input state s_t ,
 - If s_t is feasible from the most recently private state, then $\Pr[s_t]$ is set to τ and other states will have identical probability whose sum is $1 - \tau$.
 - If s_t is not feasible then all feasible states will have identical probability whose sum is 1.




Online mechanism for Markov chains

Theorem 2 (Online Mechanism is differentially private): For a sensitive input sequence $w_o = s_1^o s_2^o \dots s_n^o$ and an initial private state s_0^o , the online mechanism is word ϵ -differentially private if



$$\tau(s_t^o) = \frac{1}{(N(s_t^o) - 1) \exp\left(-\frac{\epsilon}{k}\right) + 1}$$

the number of
feasible states



Experiment

- Example Markov chain is generated by the book “Green Eggs and Ham”.
- 50 unique words → 50 states in total.
- We generate differentially private versions of a sequence “I do so like green eggs and ham thank you thank you Sam I am”.



Results for different epsilon

Sensitive input: I do so like green eggs and ham thank you thank you Sam I am




Table 1

Samples of differentially private strings with different values of the privacy parameter ϵ and initial state "anywhere".

ϵ	Start at "anywhere"	error
0.1	"you see you see so you in the dark I am say Sam Sam Sam"	15
1	"I would not eat green egg and ham thank you eat them eat them with"	8
10	"I do so like green eggs and ham thank you thank you Sam I am"	0

This is random! We just got lucky!

Different starting word incurs different errors.

Future works

- Generalize to Partial Observable MDPs.
- Using this work on multi-agent reinforcement learning.

Thanks for listening!

Result for different conditions.

Sensitive input: I do so like green eggs and ham thank you thank you Sam I am

